[kbuild-all] [integrity:next-integrity-testing 13/13] security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:181:41: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type 'unsigned int'

tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git next-integrity-testing head: 5b5aed323646d2240eb70913841ef06c94d6e9a5 commit: 5b5aed323646d2240eb70913841ef06c94d6e9a5 [13/13] evm: output EVM digest calculation info config: riscv-randconfig-r003-20210618 (attached as .config) compiler: clang version 13.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 64720f57bea6a6bf033feef4a5751ab9c0c3b401) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # install riscv cross compiling tool for clang build # apt-get install binutils-riscv64-linux-gnu # https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git... git remote add integrity https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git git fetch --no-tags integrity next-integrity-testing git checkout 5b5aed323646d2240eb70913841ef06c94d6e9a5 # save the attached .config to linux build tree COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross ARCH=riscv If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com&gt; All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): pr_debug("hmac_misc: (%lu) [%*phN]\n", sizeof(struct h_misc), ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ %u include/linux/printk.h:430:38: note: expanded from macro 'pr_debug' no_printk(KERN_DEBUG pr_fmt(fmt), ##__VA_ARGS__) ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/printk.h:140:17: note: expanded from macro 'no_printk' printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~ req_xattr_value_len, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/printk.h:430:38: note: expanded from macro 'pr_debug' no_printk(KERN_DEBUG pr_fmt(fmt), ##__VA_ARGS__) ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/printk.h:140:17: note: expanded from macro 'no_printk' printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c:286:47: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type 'size_t' (aka 'unsigned int') [-Wformat] pr_debug("%s: (%lu) [%*phN]", xattr->name, xattr_size, ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~ %u include/linux/printk.h:430:38: note: expanded from macro 'pr_debug' no_printk(KERN_DEBUG pr_fmt(fmt), ##__VA_ARGS__) ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/printk.h:140:17: note: expanded from macro 'no_printk' printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ ~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~ 3 warnings generated. vim +181 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c 138 139 /* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode 140 * specific info. 141 * 142 * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete 143 * protection.) 144 */ 145 static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, 146 char type, char *digest) 147 { 148 struct h_misc { 149 unsigned long ino; 150 __u32 generation; 151 uid_t uid; 152 gid_t gid; 153 umode_t mode; 154 } hmac_misc; 155 156 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); 157 /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable 158 * signatures 159 */ 160 if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { 161 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; 162 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; 163 } 164 /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user 165 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding 166 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack 167 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount 168 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the 169 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because 170 * everything is signed. 171 */ 172 hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); 173 hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); 174 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; 175 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); 176 if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && 177 type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) 178 crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE); 179 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); 180 182 (int) sizeof(struct h_misc), &hmac_misc); 183 } 184 185 /* 186 * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexademical string. 187 * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.) 188 */ 189 static void dump_security_xattr(const char *prefix, const void *src, size_t count) 190 { 191 #if defined(DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) 192 char *asciihex, *p; 193 194 p = asciihex = kmalloc(count * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 195 if (!asciihex) 196 return; 197 198 p = bin2hex(p, src, count); 199 *p = 0; 200 pr_debug("%s: (%lu) %.*s\n", prefix, count, (int) count * 2, asciihex); 201 kfree(asciihex); 202 #endif 203 } 204 205 /* 206 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs. 207 * 208 * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate 209 * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for 210 * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory. 211 */ 212 static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, 213 const char *req_xattr_name, 214 const char *req_xattr_value, 215 size_t req_xattr_value_len, 216 uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data) 217 { 218 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 219 struct xattr_list *xattr; 220 struct shash_desc *desc; 221 size_t xattr_size = 0; 222 char *xattr_value = NULL; 223 int error; 224 int size; 225 bool ima_present = false; 226 227 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) || 228 inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) 229 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 230 231 desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo); 232 if (IS_ERR(desc)) 233 return PTR_ERR(desc); 234 235 data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm); 236 237 error = -ENODATA; 238 list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { 239 bool is_ima = false; 240 241 if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) 242 is_ima = true; 243 244 /* 245 * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated 246 * signatures/HMACs. 247 */ 248 if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !xattr->enabled) 249 continue; 250 251 if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) 252 && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) { 253 error = 0; 254 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, 255 req_xattr_value_len); 256 if (is_ima) 257 ima_present = true; 258 259 if (req_xattr_value_len < 64) 260 pr_debug("%s: (%lu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name, 262 (int)req_xattr_value_len, 263 req_xattr_value); 264 else 265 dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name, 266 req_xattr_value, 267 req_xattr_value_len); 268 continue; 269 } 270 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr->name, 271 &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS); 272 if (size == -ENOMEM) { 273 error = -ENOMEM; 274 goto out; 275 } 276 if (size < 0) 277 continue; 278 279 error = 0; 280 xattr_size = size; 281 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); 282 if (is_ima) 283 ima_present = true; 284 285 if (xattr_size < 64) 286 pr_debug("%s: (%lu) [%*phN]", xattr->name, xattr_size, 287 (int)xattr_size, xattr_value); 288 else 289 dump_security_xattr(xattr->name, xattr_value, 290 xattr_size); 291 } 292 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest); 293 294 /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ 295 if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present) 296 error = -EPERM; 297 out: 298 kfree(xattr_value); 299 kfree(desc); 300 return error; 301 } 302 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org