On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 09:39:38AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Thu 11-02-21 09:13:19, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 09, 2021 at 02:17:11PM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Tue 09-02-21 11:09:38, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > Citing my older email:
> > >
> > > I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to
memfd_create() or to
> > > add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call
> > > started to look into man pages update. There would have been two
> > > independent descriptions and I think it would have been very
> > Could you elaborate? Unmapping from the kernel address space can work
> > both for sealed or hugetlb memfds, no? Those features are completely
> > orthogonal AFAICS. With a dedicated syscall you will need to introduce
> > this functionality on top if that is required. Have you considered that?
> > I mean hugetlb pages are used to back guest memory very often. Is this
> > something that will be a secret memory usecase?
> > Please be really specific when giving arguments to back a new syscall
> > decision.
> Isn't "syscalls have completely independent description" specific
No, it's not as you can see from questions I've had above. More on that
> We are talking about API here, not the implementation details whether
> secretmem supports large pages or not.
> The purpose of memfd_create() is to create a file-like access to memory.
> The purpose of memfd_secret() is to create a way to access memory hidden
> from the kernel.
> I don't think overloading memfd_create() with the secretmem flags because
> they happen to return a file descriptor will be better for users, but
> rather will be more confusing.
This is quite a subjective conclusion. I could very well argue that it
would be much better to have a single syscall to get a fd backed memory
with spedific requirements (sealing, unmapping from the kernel address
Neither of us would be clearly right or wrong.
100% agree :)
A more important point is a future extensibility and usability,
So let's just think of few usecases I have outlined above. Is it
unrealistic to expect that secret memory should be sealable? What about
hugetlb? Because if the answer is no then a new API is a clear win as the
combination of flags would never work and then we would just suffer from
the syscall multiplexing without much gain. On the other hand if
combination of the functionality is to be expected then you will have to
jam it into memfd_create and copy the interface likely causing more
confusion. See what I mean?
I see your point, but I think that overloading memfd_create definitely gets
us into syscall multiplexing from day one and support for seals and huge
pages in the secretmem will not make it less of a multiplexer.
Sealing is anyway controlled via fcntl() and I don't think
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING makes much sense for the secretmem because it is there to
prevent rogue file sealing in tmpfs/hugetlbfs.
As for the huge pages, I'm not sure at all that supporting huge pages in
secretmem will involve hugetlbfs. And even if yes, adding SECRETMEM_HUGE
flag seems to me less confusing than saying "from kernel x.y you can use
MFD_CREATE | MFD_SECRET | MFD_HUGE" etc for all possible combinations.
I by no means do not insist one way or the other but from what I
seen so far I have a feeling that the interface hasn't been thought
It has been, but we have different thoughts about it ;-)