On 08.02.21 11:57, Michal Hocko wrote:
On Mon 08-02-21 11:53:58, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 08.02.21 11:51, Michal Hocko wrote:
>> On Mon 08-02-21 11:32:11, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>> On 08.02.21 11:18, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>>> On Mon 08-02-21 10:49:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>>>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)linux.ibm.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>>>>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this
essentially
>>>>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>>>>
>>>>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
>>>>
>>>> Does this feature need any special handling? As it is effectivelly
>>>> unevictable memory then it should behave the same as other mlock, ramfs
>>>> which should already disable hibernation as those cannot be swapped out,
>>>> no?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Why should unevictable memory not go to swap when hibernating? We're
merely
>>> dumping all of our system RAM (including any unmovable allocations) to swap
>>> storage and the system is essentially completely halted.
>>>
>> My understanding is that mlock is never really made visible via swap
>> storage.
>
> "Using swap storage for hibernation" and "swapping at runtime"
are two
> different things. I might be wrong, though.
Well, mlock is certainly used to keep sensitive information, not only to
protect from major/minor faults.
I think you're right in theory, the man page mentions "Cryptographic
security software often handles critical bytes like passwords or secret
keys as data structures" ...
however, I am not aware of any such swap handling and wasn't able to
spot it quickly. Let me take a closer look.
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb