On Fri, 2013-08-02 at 21:53 +0200, Patrick Ohly wrote:
Add --daemon=no to the command line to prevent shifting the actual
command executing into syncevo-dbus-server and (from there)
Warning: gsignond limits access to the identity to the executable which created
it. One has to use different accounts for syncevolution with and without
--daemon=no and another account when using valgrind.
Let me highlight this observation here and ask: is this kind of access
control by executable path really useful on a normal Linux desktop? I
believe GNOME Keyring had something like that in the past and moved away
from it because it didn't not add any real security.
In this case, with gSSO, it really gets in the way.
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly
The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.