On Wed, 2019-04-10 at 17:44 +0000, Roberts, William C wrote: The engine can be loaded simply by calling ENGINE_by_id("tpm2"). If it's installed properly you shouldn't need to mess with config files etc. (We did fix the engine name to be consistent with the other implementation, so that applications don't need to try both, didn't we? Otherwise, apps need to try both "tpm2" and "tpm2-tss" engine names.) For example applications using this, see OpenConnect: http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/openssl.c... Or wpa_supplicant: https://www.spinics.net/lists/hostap/msg05728.html It isn't hard. Of course, OpenSSL should make it *easier*, and should just Do The Right Thing when it sees a PEM file with the appropriate -----BEGIN TSS2 PRIVATE KEY----- marker.... but that will take a while to fix. Perhaps if the engine were to offer an ASN1_METHOD for it?

As Bill already said: - The keys are only known to the TPM and will never be known outside, so they cannot be "stolen" or copied. Think of heartbleed or any other hacker break into your system - You can define an openssl.cnf file and env variable. See https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/man5/config.html P.S. The TPM is much slower than software. So it's not suited for high-load servers, but low-load servers or clients. (yes, works with client authentication as well) I now remember that I wanted to provide a openssl.cnf.sample file. Will add a bug for this. Cheers, Andreas ________________________________________ From: tpm2 [tpm2-bounces(a)lists.01.org] on behalf of Ralf Schlatterbeck [rsc(a)runtux.com] Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 18:27 To: tpm2(a)lists.01.org Subject: [tpm2] tpm2-tss-engine I'm testing with a TPM-2 module for the Raspberry-Pi from Infineon running on an Orange-Pi zero (also a single-board computer a little smaller than the raspi). I've successfully built tpm2-tss-engine and have the following questions: - The key generation examples in the README.md create the private key in a file on the local filesystem. Isn't the purpose of a hw-security-module that the key stays inside the device and can't be extracted? Or am I missing something here? Is there a way to create a protected key inside the device in a way that it cannot be extracted? - I'm not familiar with the engine concept of OpenSSL, is there a way to use the engine with a software that is not engine-aware? In my case the mosquitto message broker. Or would I have to modify the software? Thanks Ralf Schlatterbeck -- Dr. Ralf Schlatterbeck Tel: +43/2243/26465-16 Open Source Consulting www: http://www.runtux.com Reichergasse 131, A-3411 Weidling email: office(a)runtux.com _______________________________________________ tpm2 mailing list tpm2(a)lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/tpm2

- You need to somehow tell openssl to use "keyform = engine" Unfortunately, I don't currently know how to do this using the openssl.cnf Once we merge PR https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss-engine/pull/89 The loading of keys should work without the "keyform = engine" settings. Until then, I'm unsure how exactly this can be managed. - The engine already support ECDSA. Have a look at the -alg parameter of tpm2tss-genkey - An wrt documentation: I'd appreciate anything you seem fit. Preferably as PullRequest or as Issue on github. Emails just allways get lost. Cheers, Andreas ________________________________________ From: tpm2 [tpm2-bounces(a)lists.01.org] on behalf of Ralf Schlatterbeck [rsc(a)runtux.com] Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2019 17:43 To: tpm2(a)lists.01.org Subject: Re: [tpm2] tpm2-tss-engine On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 05:44:09PM +0000, Roberts, William C wrote: Thanks, the process of key generation looked too much like the normal ssl key generation and I didn't look into the key file. It has "BEGIN TSS2 PRIVATE KEY" which could have told me something had I looked :-) Shouldn't that be documented in one or two sentences in the README.md? On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 06:54:19PM +0000, Fuchs, Andreas wrote: On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:46:30AM +0300, David Woodhouse wrote: OK I had hoped that simply plugging an engine into the openssl config would do the trick for me: Openssl should be smart enough to figure out via the key file that it can/should use an engine to do the work. Oh well. My naive approach involved configuring the TSS2 PRIVATE KEY file as the key-file in mosquitto and setting all the engine stuff (see below). But this only gets me the 'Error: Unable to load server key file "/etc/mosquitto/certs/server.key". Check keyfile.' My current /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf looks as follows, so maybe this can be a contribution for an example file: openssl_conf = default_conf [default_conf] ssl_conf = ssl_sect engines = engine_section [engine_section] tpm = tpm_section [tpm_section] engine_id = tpm2 dynamic_path = /usr/lib/arm-linux-gnueabihf/engines-1.1/tpm2tss.so SET_TCTI = device:/dev/tpmrm0 So I'm getting correct output: root@sun8i:/# openssl engine -c -vvvv -t tpm2tss (tpm2tss) TPM2-TSS engine for OpenSSL [RSA, RAND] [ available ] SET_OWNERAUTH: Set the password for the owner hierarchy (default none) (input flags): STRING SET_TCTI: Set the TCTI module and options (default none) (input flags): STRING Just some questions here: - I take away from this question that I need to modify sourcecode to make an engine work with openssl, is this really the case? - My TPM 2.0 module from Infineon does support elliptic curves, is there a way to support this with the engine? Especially in the light of recent ROCA vulnerabilities of Infineon modules I'd like to use EC instead of RSA if possible. (see soon-to-come separate posting about ROCA) Oh, and a note on performance: My singleboard "computer" is an OrangePi zero, 256M RAM, 100M Ethernet, 5x5cm in size (but quad-core :-) so I'm not worried about performance here, the goal is a proof-of-concept implementation. Thanks Ralf Schlatterbeck -- Dr. Ralf Schlatterbeck Tel: +43/2243/26465-16 Open Source Consulting www: http://www.runtux.com Reichergasse 131, A-3411 Weidling email: office(a)runtux.com _______________________________________________ tpm2 mailing list tpm2(a)lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/tpm2